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 > Abstract
In its recent publications, the Brussels Centre Observatory attached particular importance 
to the way in which daily mobility is organized in and towards Brussels’s hypercentre. 
However, to date no attention has been paid to the impact of international mobility 
that is generated by the Brussels-Capital Region, i.e. travelling for business and leisure. 
Nevertheless, many activities that develop in the hypercentre have a strong international 
character, and the climate impact of long-distance travel cannot be underestimated.
In the Spring of 2019, Brussels was startled by the manifestations of Youth for Climate, the 
student movement that is campaigning for more vigorous climate policies. Youth for Climate’s 
actions were quickly joined by numerous related initiatives, all of which are committed to 
drastically shrinking the climate footprint of our societies, in particular in the Global North.
In the present chapter we argue that it is not by chance that these types of actions concentrate 
in a strongly internationally networked city such as Brussels. Within Europe, Brussels offers a 
highly suitable forum for internationally relevant political debates. Being a European centre of 
decision making, Brussels could be seen as part of the solution to the climate problem. The other 
side of the coin, however, is that holding an important internationally networked position goes 
hand in hand with a strong dependence on international mobility, which results in impressive 
volumes of air transport and the associated consumption of large quantities of fossil fuel.
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At the same time, aviation is strikingly often left off the hook in the climate debate. The climate 
impact of international air transport is only partly included in the official national and regional 
reporting schemes towards the UN and the EU, or in other words: it is not territorialized. If we 
look specifically at the Brussels-Capital Region, we can even say that the regional climate registry 
externalizes the vast majority of climate emissions for which Brussels’s economy is responsible. 
Officially, the Brussels-Capital Region is accountable for 3.7 megatonnes of CO2 equivalent 
(Mtonne CO2eq) per year (in 2017), which represents just 3.2% of the total Belgian greenhouse gas 
emissions. These numbers compel us to look outside the box. 
In this chapter we explore the knowledge gap with respect to the climate impact of international 
travel (by car, bus, train or air) towards the Brussels-Capital Region. Based on existing data on 
the origin of trips and the means of transport used by tourists and business overnight visitors 
heading to Brussels, we arrive at a number of striking observations. In 2018, the total estimated 
climate impact induced by the journeys studied was 2.7 Mtonne CO2eq, which equals about 
three quarters of the impact of the official emissions of all other territorial activities (including 
heating of buildings, local traffic, industrial production, etc.) in the Brussels-Capital Region 
together. What is even more worrying is that this figure seems to grow continuously by around 
4% per year, which means that the climate impact of Brussels-bound long-distance travel will 
very soon exceed the official, territorial emissions.
We conclude that the long-distance journeys to Brussels make an underestimated but very 
important and problematic contribution to climate change. Nevertheless, Brussels is particularly 
strongly networked within Europe, and therefore generates fewer air kilometres than comparable 
European cities such as Zurich or Seville that either have more intercontinental relationships or 
are less centrally located in Europe.
1   > CLIMATE WARMING ON THE POLITICAL AGENDA: 
WORLDWIDE, BUT CERTAINLY IN BRUSSELS 
In the Spring of 2019, a global wave of high school student protests placed the 
issue of global warming at the top of (at least some) political agendas. The impetus 
for this was given by the then-fifteen-year-old Swedish student Greta Thunberg, 
who, on 20 August 2018, refused to continue attending school as long as inaction 
continued (Marris, 2019). Her individual demonstration did not pass unnoticed, 
partly because she was granted the opportunity to deliver a fiery speech at the UN 
Climate Change Conference in Katowice and at the World Economic Forum, both 
in December 2018.
On Thursday 10 January, Belgian students Anuna De Wever and Kyra Gantois, la-
ter accompanied by Adelaïde Charlier, started the first actions of ‘Belgian Youth 
for Climate’ in Brussels (De Wever et al., 2019). Inspired by the Swedish exam-
ple, the Belgian campaigns also took the form of school strikes. The actions were 
repeated weekly and were unexpectedly successful. The third day of action, 24 
January, saw around 35,000 demonstrators participate. On Sunday 27 January, a 






































The Belgian movement could count on large amounts of sympathy from, among 
others, the rectors of five universities and the nation’s king. At the end of January, 
the Belgian Panel for Climate and Sustainability was founded by Leo Van Broeck, 
the official Flemish government architect, and Jean-Pascal Van Ypersele, climate 
expert at the Université catholique de Louvain. The panel was intended to offer 
scientific support to Belgian Youth for Climate. Anticipating the regional, federal 
and European elections, on 14 May 2019 the panel’s findings were presented to 
Belgian policymakers at various levels in the form of a memorandum.
Parallel to the actions of Belgian Youth for Climate and the Belgian Panel for Cli-
mate and Sustainability, two enthusiastic entrepreneurs started the ‘Sign for my 
Future’ campaign, based on the idea that the engagement of a number of industry 
leaders would aid the mainstreaming of climate action, and would encourage the 
government to organize the required mitigation efforts in an equitable manner.
Although the rise of climate demonstrations in Brussels was not of the same order 
of magnitude as the legendary anti-missile demonstration of 23 October 1983 
(around 400,000 participants), or the White March of 20 October 1996 (around 
300,000 participants), its persistent and structural nature was remarkable, with 
21 climate marches being held from January to September 2019, according to 
Schoolstaking voor het Klimaat – Wikipedia, 2020, even from the perspective of 
historical manifestations in Belgium. The actions of Youth for Climate were widely 
picked up by foreign media, and were replicated outside of Belgium. Nevertheless, 
the climate school strike campaign of 24 January 2019 remains one of the largest 
of its kind.
It is no coincidence that some of the largest climate actions have been conducted 
in Brussels. The presence of the European institutions, lobbies, NGOs and interna-
tional media, the geographically central position in Europe, and the cosmopolitan 
character of the city make Brussels a forum perfect for international societal deba-
te (Vandermotten, 2013; Van Parijs and Van Parys, 2010). It was not a coincidence 
either that in February 2019 Greta Thunberg travelled to Brussels by train, not only 
to support Belgian Youth for Climate, but also to meet Jean-Claude Juncker, the 
then-president of the European Commission.
Optimists will see the cosmopolitan nature of Brussels, which facilitates 
internationally oriented social and political debate, as part of the solution. But at 
the same time, it is hard to deny that the internationalization of society, from which 
a city like Brussels is reaping the economic benefits, has become an important part 
of the climate burden itself. To keep their ecological footprint as low as possible, 
Greta Thunberg and her fellow campaigners travel by train and sailing ship, but 
they are exceptions. A significant share of international visitors to Brussels arrives 
by plane, which is the least climate-friendly option (Borken-Kleefeld et al., 2013).
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2  > THE PITFALL OF A TERRITORIAL APPROACH TO 
EMISSIONS REGISTRIES
However, the ‘climate footprint’ of international mobility, which goes hand-in-
hand with internationalization, is not particularly prominent within the debate on 
global warming. In the national greenhouse gas registries, which must be main-
tained by every industrialized country (i.e. ‘Annex I country’) under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, neither international air traffic nor international sea shipping needs to be 
included according to current agreements (emissions related to domestic traffic, 
however, are reported). The current logic applies the assumption that these emis-
sions should not be allocated to individual countries.
In addition, emissions related to the production at distance of imported goods, 
so-called embedded emissions, are not included in the national greenhouse gas 
registries either. These embedded emissions include the production of finished 
products (such as clothing, household supplies, or imported food), but also semi-fi-
nished products such as steel (Davis and Caldeira, 2010). These emissions are only 
registered by the countries that produce these goods (if at all), and not by those 
who consume them.
Such a territorial approach to the allocation of greenhouse gas emissions causes 
an important bias in the way in which the media reports on climate issues. In 
reality, emissions from international transport are caused by consumers, citizens 
or organizations that are established in certain, identifiable, countries, just as 
consumers that are at least partly responsible for the emissions related to the 
initial production of imported products.
In fact, the territorial focus of the climate registries ignores the internationalization 
of production chains, and the structural shift towards service industries 
(tertiarization) of the economy of the most developed countries. Emissions are 
viewed as soil-bound affairs, while economic activities are increasingly becoming 
footloose. Within the theme of embedded emissions, for example, this approach 
explains why the closure of the last blast furnaces in Wallonia in 2011 has led to 
a decrease in the industrial emissions registered in Belgium (FPB et al., 2018). In 
contrast with what appears from the statistics, however, there is no indication 
that less steel has been consumed in Belgium and, consequently, that emissions 
associated with steel use have reduced.
With regard to international long-distance transport, the aforementioned bias 
is at least as problematic. The shift from manufacturing to a service economy is 
clearly accompanied by a shift of the centre of gravity of emissions, away from 
geo-localized production processes, and toward the more-or-less ‘footloose’ sector 
of long-distance transport. Reductions within national industrial production are 
clearly visible in the national climate registries. However, increases in international 






































registries. It is nevertheless quite possible that the tertiary sector, which includes 
the knowledge economy, the tourism industry and logistics services, is almost 
as carbon-dependent as the traditional manufacturing industry. Discussing the 
tourism industry specifically, Gössling et al. (2005: 432) already stated that ‘tourism 
is not necessarily environmentally more beneficial than other economic activities, 
as claimed by the tourist industry’.
3  > THE CLIMATE FOOTPRINT OF 
INTERNATIONALIZATION: INVISIBLE, BUT 
STRUCTURAL
The impact of the territorial approach to emission registration upon debate is also 
clear from the memorandum of the Belgian Panel for Climate and Sustainability 
(Van Broeck and Van Ypersele, 2019), which supports the actions of Youth for 
Climate. It is striking how the emphasis in the memorandum is put on ‘traditional’ 
mitigation measures such as urban and regional planning, sustainable local and 
regional mobility, transition in the field of domestic energy use, expansion of 
natural and forested areas, and developing a more sustainable agricultural and food 
sector. With regard to international transport, only two measures are proposed, 
namely (1) ‘Reduce the rampant growth of air traffic’ and (2) ‘Tackle emissions from 
maritime transport’ (Van Broeck and Van Ypersele, 2019: 77).
Despite the good intentions behind the recommendations on aviation and 
shipping in the report, the Panel tends to ignore the high degree of complexity 
that lies behind the continuous growth of international transport and logistics. 
The tertiarization of the economy of the Global North, and the growth of the 
knowledge industry in the same part of the world, may be equally dependent on 
fossil fuels as the manufacturing industry. This is due to the fact that tertiarization 
is partly driven by the possibility of outsourcing core manufacturing activities to 
remote low-wage countries. However, the carbon required for this outsourced 
production is not visible in the national climate registries of the Annex I 
countries (David and Caldeira, 2010), and neither are the emissions associated 
with shipping the products. Moreover, part of the production chain, including 
research and development and commercial activities, often remains located 
in the importing countries, which means that numerous air trips are made to 
support this internationally integrated production system.
But aviation does not only support the manufacturing industry. The knowledge 
industry is also an important consumer of air kilometres, as are international po-
litics, sports, culture, tourism, and all kinds of visits between families and friends 
across state boundaries. Within the academic sector, Erasmus programmes fi-
nancially support European students’ studies far away from home, with support 
increasing parallel to the travel distance. Researchers are encouraged to develop 
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international networks and are therefore supposed to travel on a regular basis, of-
ten by aeroplane. Although Wynes et al. (2019) state that there is no direct link 
between frequent flying and academic productivity, they do find in their research a 
link between the level of salary among academic staff and their air travel frequen-
cies (in the specific context of the University of British Columbia, Canada). In a 
different Canadian case, Arsenault et al. (2019) found that international students 
emit an average of 3.85 tonnes of CO2eq per capita per year during their journeys, 
and professors no less than 10.76 tonnes. Impressive figures, certainly if you put 
them in the perspective of the official total emissions of the Belgian economy, 
which for 2017 amounted to 10.1 tonnes of CO2eq per capita.
But international politics, including the European institutions and the many lob-
bying organizations present in Brussels, also have their own ecological footprint. 
Moreover, the relocation of families within which one member is active in the in-
ternational sector often entails additional journeys, for example by relatives and 
friends who visit them. This final category of journeys falls under the category of 
‘tourism’, which in the Global North comprises the bulk of all international jour-
neys (Dobruszkes et al., 2019).
The emissions associated with such trips are not presented in the national cli-
mate registries. Boussauw and Vanoutrive (2019) calculated that the emissions 
associated with flights departing from Brussels Airport are equivalent to 5.7% of 
the total official emissions of Belgium, and almost as high as those of the most 
important industrial emitter in Belgium (the ArcelorMittal steel manufacturing 
plant in Ghent). The emissions from international transport are not only absent 
from the climate registry, but are also underexposed in the climate debate itself. 
Typical of this situation is the observation that Arnaud Feist, the CEO of Brussels 
Airport Company, could in 2019 publicly cynically subscribe to the ‘Sign for my Fu-
ture’ campaign without much resistance, while the CEOs of the registered major 
industrial greenhouse gas emitters, including ArcelorMittal, Total and BASF, wise-
ly chose not to engage in this campaign, probably well aware that public opinion 
might denounce such an act as hypocritical.
4  > BRUSSELS’S CLIMATE FOOTPRINT
In 2017, according to the Belgian greenhouse gas registry, total greenhouse gas 
emissions amounted to 114.5 Mtonne CO2eq (FPS Public Health, Food Chain Safe-
ty and Environment, 2018), of which only 3.7 Mtonne CO2eq (3.2%) was attributed 
to the Brussels-Capital Region (Bruxelles Environnement, 2019). This remarkably 
modest contribution stands out even more when we consider the fact that in 2017 
the Brussels-Capital Region not only housed 10.5% of the Belgian population, but 
also generated 17.8% of the Belgian gross domestic product (GDP). These figures 
are grist to the mill of those who claim that city dwellers, by definition, live more 






































city is the most sustainable urban form’.3 Indeed, the official carbon intensity of 
the Brussels economy is around 5.5 times smaller than that of the Belgian average.
Nevertheless, the territorial pitfall is once more not far away. The Brussels-Capi-
tal Region is an important consumer of food and industrial products, almost none 
of which are produced upon its own territory. The emissions from traffic located 
within the boundaries of the region are also rather limited, given its modest sur-
face area. And even if the emissions of planes and ships fuelling in Belgium were 
to be included in the territorial climate registry in the future, Brussels would still 
score very well, since no airport is located in the Brussels-Capital Region, likewise 
seaports.
Just as Belgium is externalizing an important part of the emissions for which the 
Belgians are responsible to low-wage countries and to all sorts of foreign travel 
destinations, Brussels is externalizing an even larger part of its emissions to its 
hinterland.
5  > METHODOLOGY
Mapping the entire, actual climate footprint of the Brussels-Capital Region is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, although such an endeavour would be of high 
interest for further enquiry. Rather, what we aim to do in this paper is explore 
the magnitude and trends of emissions associated with the long-distance travel 
involved in the international activities that are hosted in Brussels, and which 
currently lie at the core of Brussels’s economy. This concerns all international 
journeys to and from Brussels, taking into account both inward and outward 
trips regardless of the purpose of the trip (business, politics, science, education, 
tourism), and will focus on direct emissions only, which result from combustion 
in vehicles, not taking into account indirect emissions linked to, for instance, to 
oilfield exploitation, fuel refining, or the manufacturing of vehicles.
In this way, we subscribe to an existing tradition of research into sustainable tou-
rism. In that context, Peeters and Schouten (2006), for example, already investiga-
ted the ecological footprint of tourism to Amsterdam. A similar assessment was 
recently carried out for Barcelona (Rico et al., 2019). In both cases, the results show 
that the overwhelming share of tourist visits’ climate impact is attributable to tra-
vel to the destination, in particular to long-distance air travel.
Various methods have been developed to assess the importance of the climate 
footprint of tourist trips to specific destinations, which usually and deliberately ex-
clude outward trips made by residents of the city or region in question. Most stu-
dies combine data on the number of international overnight visitors (or ‘tourists’ 
3 More recent literature reveals that the daily travel patterns of city dwellers are indeed relati-
vely local, but that the positive environmental effects of it are compensated for by more fre-
quent non-daily trips over long distances, see e.g. Longuar et al, 2010.
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according to definition of the World Tourism Organization4) with modal split figu-
res that vary according to their origin, trip length, and standardized emission rate 
per passenger kilometre (for a summary, see Peeters et al., 2007). In what follows, 
we will use the terms ‘overnight visitor’ and ‘tourist’ as synonyms for one another. 
When making a distinction between overnight visitors or tourists who are visi-
ting for holiday or business purposes, we will use the concepts of ‘leisure’ versus 
‘business’.
Table 1 presents the data used and the processes employed to compute the indica-
tors required for the analysis. Various sources and methods were used to develop 
two components of our assessment, respectively (1) measuring the climate impact 
related to international travel to and from Brussels in 2018, and (2) comparing the 
case of Brussels with a number of other European cities.
 > Table 1. Methodology: dimensions, scope, indicators and data sources
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Distance between the centre 
of Brussels and centroid 
of each country of origin 
weighted by the spatial 
distribution of the population.
Own calculations based on gridded population datasets 
(https://www.popgrid.org) provided by The Center for 
International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) 
(http://www.ciesin.org). For air travel, distance between 
origin and destination was multiplied by a coefficient to 
take into account the existence of detours (i.e. longer 
itineraries than the great-circle distance). We used the 
coefficients computed by Dobruszkes and Peeters (2019): 
1.143 for  distances less than 1000 km. 1.073 for 1000-4000 





Distance between the centre 
of Belgium and centroid of 
each country of origin.





Greenhouse gas emissions per 
passenger kilometre. class of 
distance and travel mode.
For airplanes: own calcuations based on CO2 emissions 
for all the flights to/from Brussels airport in 2018. 
The data on the provision of regular air services in 
Brussels Airport have been extracted from the 2018 
OAG Schedules Analyser (https://www.oag.com). For 
each flight. CO2 emissions were calculated by using 
EUROCONTROL small emitters tools (https://www.
eurocontrol.int/publication/small-emitters-tool-
set-2019). Based on the World airline rankings 2018 
(https://www.flightglobal.com), a seat occupancy rate 
of 80% has been used to estimate the number of 
passengers for each flight. The  calculated emission 
factors by classes of distance (expressed in kg CO2 pkm) 
are: 0.144 for distances less than 500 km. 0.108 for 500 - 
1000 km. 0.090 for 1000 - 1500 km. 0.084 for 1500-2000 
km and 0.093 for more than 2000 km. In a second time, 
according to the literature (DEFRA. 2016), the emission 
factors were multiplied by 1.9 to convert CO2 emissions 
into CO2eq ('climate impact'). 
For car :  0.102 kg CO2 pkm (Christensen. 2016).
For rail : 0.027 kg CO2 pkm (Peeters et al.. 2007).





Greenhouse gas emissions per 
passenger kilometre. class of 
distance and travel mode.
Peeters et al. (2007).
Several of the choices made in order to develop the first component need to be out-
lined. Firstly, we used survey data to estimate the distribution of international arri-
vals in Brussels by travel mode in 2018 according to the overnight visitors’ origins. 
Although this data relates only to a limited number of origins and does not resolve 
the complicated question of multi-destination tours in which tourists from distant 
markets take part, it offers the advantage that it represents real trips instead of a 
model, an approach taken by Gunter and Wöber (2019), among others.
Secondly, for the computation of the distances between Brussels and the countries 
of origin of the overnight visitors, we have taken into account the intra-national 
spatial distribution of the population, which provides the basis of persons that will 
potentially travel. The measured distance therefore corresponds to the distance 
between Brussels and the centroid of each country weighted by the spatial distri-
bution of population based on 2015 data, aggregated in a 1 km² rectangular grid. 
In the case of air travel, we have been paying attention to the fact that in practice, 
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for various reasons (technical, environmental, political or social), aircraft routes 
usually do not follow the so-called ‘great circle distance’, which is the shortest path 
from a geometrical perspective (Dobruszkes, 2019). So, for each origin-destination 
pair, we have corrected the ‘shortest distance’ using the coefficients per distance 
class as provided by Dobruszkes and Peeters (2019).
Thirdly, we distinguished between modes of transport with respect to emission 
rates per passenger kilometre travelled. We started from the figures provided by 
Peeters et al. (2007), a well-cited source that has nevertheless become slightly 
outdated. Since the published rates were calculated in 2004, they needed to be 
updated with respect to air and car travel. Indeed, both modes have faced fleet 
renewal that has led to lower emissions per passenger kilometre during operations. 
In the case of air transport, we have updated the rates ourselves, based on real 
aircraft fleet in use for air services at Brussels Airport in 2018 (Table 1 shows more 
details). Depending on the distance, the obtained rates are 15% to 30% lower than 
those calculated back in 2004. With respect to car transport, we used the results 
of a recent study in Denmark (Christensen, 2016), which show that emissions per 
passenger kilometre were 25% lower in 2015 compared to 2004. Updating was not 
necessary, however, for emissions from trains and buses, as the current figures 
are very close to those measured in 2004 (see for example Prussi and Lonza, 2018, 
for trains, and DEFRA, 2016, for coaches). Finally, in order to estimate the total 
climate impact of air travel, effects caused by emissions of other gases (e.g. NOx, 
water vapour) at high altitude should be added to CO2 emissions. For this purpose, 
we have weighted CO2 emissions through the application of a multiplier of 1.9, as 
suggested in the literature (DEFRA, 2016), in order to convert CO2 into CO2eq. Such 
a correction pertains to air travel only, and not to other modes of transport.
We can state that our method will result in an underestimation of the climate im-
pact of international travel to and from Brussels for two reasons. Firstly, a portion 
of international tourist arrivals is not included in our statistics. According to our 
calculations (see Wayens et al., in this book ), based on the AirDNA database, which 
lists the assets leased on the Airbnb and Home Away platforms, in 2017 nearly 
34,000 beds, amounting more or less to the same number of beds in registered 
accommodation, would be absent from official registries. According to the same 
study, failing to take into account this vast set of unregistered accommodation 
would lead to an underestimation of tourist arrivals by around 30%. Furthermore, 
it should be borne in mind that these figures do not cover informal accommodati-
on such as beds offered by friends and family members. However, this offer is pro-
bably important in Brussels, considering the high proportion of foreign residents, 
particularly those originating from wealthy states such as the European Union, 
North America and Japan. Additionally, a survey that was carried out in 2018-19 
across Brussels’s museums showed that one-fifth of all international overnight vi-







































Another source of underestimation of climate impacts concerns the itineraries of 
air travellers. Indeed, our calculations do not account for the impact of stopovers 
in air trips to Brussels. Yet many passengers do not employ direct flights to Brussels, 
either because their desired connection is simply not offered as a direct flight (e.g., 
Sydney-Brussels or San Francisco-Brussels), or because an indirect route might be 
cheaper. This approach causes some bias, since the climate impact of take-off is 
proportionally higher than that of an aircraft while cruising (Baumeister, 2017).
On the other hand, our calculations attribute the entirety of emissions associated 
with travel to Europe to the Brussels-Capital Region. Yet, most intercontinental 
leisure tourists take advantage of the opportunity to visit multiple destinations 
when travelling to Europe. This is the case for tourists that travel in groups, using 
the format of the low-cost coach tours that are offered by many non-European 
tour operators and have become popular among, in particular, Chinese tourists 
(Arlt, 2013; Bui and Trupp, 2014; Xiang, 2013). This is also a common practice for 
Japanese, Korean or Chinese tourists travelling independently (Pendzialek, 2016). 
Although less well documented, this phenomenon is probably also common 
among individual tourists from other distant markets, such as the United States, 
Canada and Australia.
We decided to maintain this choice for two reasons. Firstly, among intercontinen-
tal overnight visitors, almost half of individuals came to Brussels for business rea-
sons. In this case, it is likely that most stays in Europe do not include travel to other 
cities. Secondly, at present there are no quantitative studies on the distribution of 
intercontinental tourists coming to Europe in terms of number of cities visited and 
respective lengths of stay. We therefore have no solid empirical basis that would 
allow for a redistribution of the emissions related to tourist stays in Europe across 
several destinations. 
For this first part of the analysis, we conclude that some of the choices we made 
contributed to an underestimation of the climate impact, while another choice 
leads to a ‘maximum’ estimation that could be considered an upward bias. Although 
these contrasting effects partly compensate for each other, it is important to stress 
again the exploratory nature of our study, and to place the results obtained from 
our calculations in the right perspective.
For the second part of our analysis, which comprises a comparison with other 
European cities, we relied exclusively on the data on arrivals and associated CO2 
emissions, as provided by the TourMis database (https://www.tourmis.info ). These 
statistics also underestimate the numbers of international arrivals in the cities 
studied, but overestimate CO2 emissions, since they are based on higher (outdated) 
rates of emissions per passenger kilometre. Finally, it should be noted that the 
emissions measured comprise CO2 only, since no multiplier has been applied to 
account for non-CO2-related climate effects.
148
6  > A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE BRUSSELS CASE IN 
2018
In 2018, the Brussels-Capital Region registered around 2.9  million international 
arrivals in recognized tourist accommodation. As such, Brussels represents an 
important, although not a major, urban destination in Europe. Its attractiveness 
remains modest compared to Paris and London (approximately 13  million 
international arrivals for each city), the two main poles of urban leisure and 
business tourism in Europe. The same applies when compared to cities that are 
well established as destinations for tourists from distant markets, both as city-
trip destinations and as part of intra-European tours, be it individually visited or 
as part of a group (Rome, 9.6 million arrivals; Barcelona,  7.4 million; Amsterdam, 
6.9  million; Prague, 6.7  million; Vienna, 6.3  million; Madrid, 5.2 million; Berlin, 
4.9 million; Lisbon, 4.3 million; Venice, 4.3 million; Budapest, 3.8 million). Even 
Munich and Copenhagen, which are less well known as international tourist 
attractions, welcome more international overnight visitors than Brussels. The 
situation does not change if we account for the size of the city. Indeed, the number 
of international arrivals per inhabitant is lower in Brussels than in all the cities 
listed above, with the exception of Budapest.
In Brussels, as in other European metropolises, a very large majority of accom-
modations and overnight stays are located within the city centre. The Pentagon 
(hypercentre) alone accounts for around 40% of the registered rooms and over-
night stays. Taking into account the Louise district, Northern quarter and Leopold 
districts, the city centre alone accounts for no less than 70 to 80% of the officially 
registered accommodation capacity and associated overnight stays. Therefore, the 
overwhelming majority of the carbon footprint linked to tourist travel to Brussels 
is directly attributable to the use of the city centre.
As shown in Figure 1, the vast majority of international overnight visitors staying 
in Brussels arrive from a limited number of states, with 70% of arrivals originating 
from the 12 most important ones. European states (70.5% of arrivals), especially 
neighbouring countries (41%), are the main source of overnight visitors, whether 
for leisure or for business purposes. Among the most distant origins, the United 
States (217,000 arrivals, 7.7% of the total), China (88,000, 3.1%) and, to a lesser ex-
tent, Japan (48,000, 1.7%), Brazil (41,000, 1.4%) and Russia (38,000, 1.3%) stand out 
clearly. The map also highlights not-insignificant volumes of arrivals from Canada 
(32,000), India (27,000) and Australia (25,000).
Given the important presence of international public bodies and the rather limited 
attractiveness of Brussels as a leisure destination, the number of arrivals with a 
leisure purpose has been significantly lower than the number of business trips for 
many decades. However, since the early 2000s the proportions of the two types of 
travel have gradually become more balanced. Currently, overall shares are more-








































































































of origin (Figure 1). Business overnight visitors arriving from Europe (except for 
Spain), the United States, Arabian/Persian  Gulf countries and Southeast Asia 
(including Japan) are generally overrepresented, while the reverse is true for 
arrivals from Latin America, Russia, India, China, Australia and New Zealand.
The geography of the origin of the flows of international overnight visitors staying 
in Brussels results from the combined effects of distance, the economic and 
population-based potential of origin countries for generating tourists, and local 
preferences in terms of destination choice behaviour. In an attempt to disentangle 
the influence of these different factors, we have broken down international arrivals 
by distance class (Table  2). The results show that the volume of flows decreases 
rapidly with distance: nearly 50% of arrivals come from within a radius of less 
than 1,000  km from Brussels, 20% from a radius between 1,000 and 2,000  km, 
while barely 2.5% originates from countries located at a distance between 2,000 
and 3,000 km. Beyond 3,000 km, the relationship between distance and number 
of arrivals is adjusted according to variations in population size and per capita 
income between distance classes. The two distance classes between 7,000 and 
9,000  km each produce more international overnight visitors to Brussels than 
those between 2,000 and 7,000 km, because they respectively include India and 
the United States (7,000 to 8,000 km) and China and Brazil (8,000 to 9,000 km). 
The expected negative relationship between distance and number of arrivals is only 
partly compensated for by the larger population in more remote distance classes, 
as shown by the number of arrivals in Brussels per 100,000 inhabitants in the 
origin classes (Table 2). Indeed, if the relative volume of flows to Brussels decreases 
steadily to a distance of 5,000  km, it increases between 5,000 and 8,000  km, 
then again between 9,000 and 10,000  km. These variations result in part from 
differences in per capita income in proportion to number of tourists generated. It 
is clear that those intermediate distance classes, which are characterized by a lower 
number of arrivals per 100,000 inhabitants, are generally characterized by a fairly 
modest per capita GDP (see for example the classes of 4,000 to 6,000 kilometres).
 > Table 2. International tourist arrivals and associated climate impact upon the 
Brussels-Capital Region (2018), by distance class
Distance 
class (km)
International tourist arrivals Greenhouse gases emissions
For all transport 
modes


















Airplane Train Car Coach Total
< 1,000 1,330 47.3 486 96 108 81 2.4 0.6 0.9 0.0 4.0
 1,000 - 1,999 639 22.7 179 62 242 378 8.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 8.9
 2,000 - 2,999 71 2.5 52 23 61 868 2.3 2.3
 3,000 - 3,999 67 2.4 20 10 85 1,265 3.1 3.1
 4,000 - 4,999 32 1.1 5 5 54 1,677 2.0 2.0






































 6,000 - 6,999 40 1.4 12 15 95 2,372 3.5 3.5
 7,000 - 7,999 251 8.9 13 8 680 2,707 25.2 25.2
 8,000 - 8,999 155 5.5 8 5 503 3,246 18.6 18.6
 9,000 - 9,999 119 4.2 21 10 419 3,523 15.5 15.5
> 10,000 81 2.9 14 8 396 4,911 14.7 14.7
Total 2,814 100.0 37 21 2,701 960 97.6 0.9 1.4 0.1 100.0
Sources: StatBel World Population Prospects (2019), World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2019), 
Art Cities Research (2017-18); Peeters et al. (2007); Christensen (2016), own calculations based on OAG data and 
EUROCONTROL small emitters tools
Then, we also calculated the ratio between tourist arrivals and GDP in PPP5 
(Table 1). Taking into account GDP in PPP will, in principle, neutralize the effects of 
population size and per capita income upon the number of tourists generated. The 
result shows a steady decrease of the relative volume of flows with distance, with a 
few exceptions. These exceptions result from particularities of the origin countries, 
such as the absence of the right to paid leave, the right to leave the country for 
leisure purposes, or the presence of effects of economic or cultural thresholds 
upon travel. For example, the class of 4,000 to 5,000 kilometres is characterized 
by a very modest number of tourist arrivals per billion dollars of GDP. In this group 
we find a number of countries which, while having a high GDP, still send a very 
low number of tourists (Iran, Nigeria), or clearly favour destinations other than 
Belgium (Saudi Arabia). Conversely, the 6,000 to 7,000 km class shows a relatively 
high number of tourists because it includes the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Burundi, Rwanda and Canada. The three African countries mentioned here have 
privileged  links with Belgium that were inherited from the colonial period, while 
Canada’s tendency to generate tourists may be related to relatively strong links 
between Francophone regions.
To conclude the current section, in Figure 2 tourist arrivals to Brussels have been 
correlated with the GDP of origin countries. In the Balkans, Ukraine and Belarus, 
lower propensities to travel to Brussels can be observed relative to Scandinavia, 
Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean islands (Cyprus, Malta). The map also shows 
the unique situations of Israel, the United Arab Emirates, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo and Hong Kong, for which the relative volume of arrivals to Brussels 
is significant, at least in relation to the distance travelled and the respective levels 
of GDP. The same is true, albeit to a lesser extent, for Brazil and the southern part of 
Latin America, and for Australia and New Zealand.
According to our calculations, international tourist travel to the Brussels-Capital 
Region generated a total of 1,452 kilotonnes of CO2 (or 1,452 Mtonne CO2) in 2018, 
when considering both inbound and outbound trips. It should be noted that this 
estimate is 15% lower than that provided by TourMis database (1,670 kilotonnes of 
CO2). The difference is mainly due to the updated coefficients used here to calcu-
late CO2 emissions per passenger kilometre in air transport. This observation calls 






























































































































































for the regular updating of emission coefficients, in order to take into account the 
improved energy efficiency of air transport.
After applying the 1.9 multiplier to air trips, the climate impact of all international 
travel to Brussels in 2018 amounts to around 2,701 kilotonnes of CO2 equivalent 
(i.e. 2.70 Mtonne CO2eq), or approximately 73% of the entirety of all greenhouse 
gas emissions (all activities combined, including the residential sector and inter-
nal transport, but obviously excluding international travel) that were officially re-
ported by the Brussels-Capital Region in 2018.
Examination of the distribution of tourism-induced climate impacts reveals a 
geography that is radically different from that of tourist arrivals. In fact, while the 
number of arrivals sharply decreases with distance, the amount of emissions in-
creases with distance (Table 2). Thus, while overnight visits from Europe account 
for 70.5% of arrivals, they generate barely 15% of emissions, while arrivals from 
outside Europe, accounting for less than 30% of tourists (leisure and business 
combined), are responsible for nearly 85% of emissions.
This striking result can be explained by the specific relationship between air trans-
port and climate impact, which is brought forward by Figure 3, a map linking emis-
sions by origin country to journeys to Brussels. The very significant climate impact 
of flows from the United States (21% of impact for 7.6% of flows) and China (10% 
versus 3%) stand out, as do those of Japan (6% versus 1.7%) and Australia (5.5% 
versus 0.9%). Only one European state is present among the top ten countries in 
terms of emissions, Spain, which is the only origin country that combines a very 
large number of overnight visitors to Brussels with a significant share of air travel.
7  > A COMPARISON WITH OTHER EUROPEAN CITIES
In the current section, we use data collected by TourMis to first examine the evolu-
tion of CO2 emissions linked to tourist arrivals in Brussels from 2000 on, and then 
compare the 2018 figures for Brussels with those observed in other urban destina-
tions in Europe.
In less than twenty years, CO2 emissions caused by tourist trips to Brussels have 
more than doubled (Table 3). This strong increase results less from a generalized 
growth in international arrivals (which only increased by 33%) than from the 
accretion of tourist flows originating from distant markets, especially from 
eastern Asia (+66% from South Korea since 2010, +38% from China since 2005) 
and southern Asia (+374% from India since 2005), but also from Russia (+181% 
since 2000), Brazil (+99% since 2010) and Argentina (+250% since 2010). At the 
same time, flows originating from Europe grew only a little (+14%), but with very 
contrasting trends between origins (since 2000: +61% from France, +97% from 



































































































































































































Sweden). These trends are the result of a multitude of factors, the analysis of which 
is beyond the scope and objectives of the current chapter.
 > Table 3. Development of international tourist arrivals in the Brussels-Capital Region 
and of CO2 emissions linked to these arrivals (2000–2018)




Europe Asia America Africa Oceania Total
2000 1,810 87 195 15 10 2,161 813
2018 2,057 281 357 44 29 2,867 1,677
Growth index 114 323 183 292 295 133 206
Source: TourMis (2019)
While the CO2 emissions of tourist travel to Brussels have sharply increased since 
2000, they remain quite modest compared to those observed for the main urban 
destinations in Europe (Table 4).6 Overall, the observed emission volume in Brus-
sels is 7.9 times less than of Paris, 6.4 times less than of London and 2.0 times less 
than of Barcelona.
 > Table 4. International tourist arrivals in a number of European urban destinations 
and volumes of CO2 emissions associated with these arrivals (2018)
Cities International tourist 
arrivals ( x 1,000)
CO2 emissions
Total (kT) Per international tourist 
arrival (kg)
Paris 13,217 13,236 1,001
London 13,037 10,866 833
Barcelona 7,408 4,994 674
Amsterdam 6,922 4,908 709
Prague 6,671 4,764 714
Vienna 6,288 4,358 693
Madrid 5,205 5,207 1,000
Lisbon 4,295 3,859 898
Budapest 3,823 2,970 777
Munich 3,758 3,237 861
Brussels 2,867 1,677 585
6 Due to data constraints, this table is limited to CO2 emissions, to which no multiplier for air 
transport was applied. Consequently, the climate impact of those cities with an above-average 
share of air transport (and therefore only a small share of other modes of transport, i.e. train, 
bus and car) will be underestimated compared to those cities that are less dependent on air 
transport.
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Zurich 2,051 2,062 1,005
Seville 1,722 1,448 841
Hamburg 1,605 849 529
Tallinn 1,463 555 379
Salzburg 1,369 959 701
Warsaw 1,365 828 607
Dubrovnik 1,217 1,274 1,047
Helsinki 1,199 791 660
Zagreb 1,178 1,103 936
Valencia 1,131 766 677
Source: TourMis (2019)
Although this modest impact is partly due to the limited volume of tourist arrivals 
in Brussels, it is also the result of the relatively low level of CO2 emissions asso-
ciated with these arrivals. When comparing twenty destinations. each of which 
welcomes more than a million international arrivals per year. Brussels is among 
those cities with the most climate-friendly tourists. In order to explain this peculi-
ar situation, we have examined arrivals by geographical origin in four destinations 
which have a number of international arrivals comparable to Brussels’s figure (i.e. 
Budapest, Munich, Zurich and Seville) but report much higher climate emissions 
per arrival (Table 5). Unsurprisingly, the results show that tourist arrivals in Brus-
sels from distant markets are proportionally less numerous. A comparison with 
Zurich, where CO2 emissions per arrival are by far the highest, helps clarify this 
further. While in Brussels the European market provides 70% of arrivals, Europe 
only represents 49% of arrivals in the economic capital of Switzerland. The oppo-
site situation prevails in distant markets: in Zurich 28.5% and 19.2% of arrivals ori-
ginate from Asia and America respectively, compared to 9.8% and 12.4% for the 
Brussels-Capital Region.
 > Table 5. International tourist arrivals in 5 European urban destinations and volume 
of CO2 emissions associated with these arrivals (2018)
Origin International tourist arrivals (2018)





















Europe 2,551 66.7 2,193 58.4 2,057 71.8 1,008 49.1 1,046 60.7
Asia 712 18.6 764 20.3 281 9.8 584 28.5 145 8.4
of which ...
China 200 5.2 191 5.1 88 3.1 128 6.2 49 2.8
India 49 1.3 41 1.1 27 1.0 105 5.1 0 0.0
Japan 49 1.3 93 2.5 48 1.7 46 2.3 28 1.6
South Korea 140 3.7 50 1.3 14 0.5 33 1.6 28 1.6
America 478 12.5 660 17.6 357 12.4 394 19.2 362 21.0
of which ...






































Canada 46 1.2 49 1.3 32 1.1 15 0.7 20 1.2
Brazil 26 0.7 47 1.3 41 1.4 33 1.6 25 1.4
Other origins 82 2.2 140 3.7 172 6.0 66 3.2 169 9.8
of which ... 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Australia 48 1.3 68 1.8 25 0.9 41 2.0 17 1.0








777 861 585 1005 841
Source: TourMis (2019)
8  > CONCLUSION
Territorializing the international share of Brussels’s climate impact is not an easy 
task. In our analysis, numerous methodological choices had to be made, and, 
furthermore, the scarce availability of data imposed additional limitations. In our 
calculation, we chose to only include the climate impact of overnight visitors with 
Brussels as a destination, assuming that the climate impact of journeys undertaken 
by Brussels residents would likewise be allocated to the destination territory. 
However, we were unable to cover international overnight visitors who stayed 
in unregistered accommodation, which means that our analysis significantly 
underestimates the total number of tourists (leisure and business combined) 
to Brussels. Furthermore, we were not able to redistribute the climate impact of 
overnight visitors arriving in Brussels among the multiple destinations they often 
visit as part of a single European trip, which implies that we overestimated the 
climate impact of a portion of the tourists, notably those arriving from countries 
that were not specified in the Art Cities Research. We are also aware that the 
climate impact as calculated by us covers only one, albeit an important, climate 
aspect of Brussels’s international position. Emissions created in the supply chain 
of imported products were not calculated, nor was the share of Brussels’s economy 
in the climate footprint of international sea shipping. Another comment that must 
be made is the significant degree of uncertainty associated with the multiplier that 
was used to translate CO2 emissions of aircraft into overall climate impact (defined 
as 1.9 in the current study).
Despite all reservations that need to be taken into account, and the exploratory 
nature of our calculations, we can still report a number of striking findings. The 
calculated climate impact of international journeys with Brussels as a destination 
equalled 2.7  Mtonne  CO2eq in the year  2018, which is equivalent to about three 
quarters of the official total amount of emissions of the Brussels-Capital Region 
as recorded by the Belgian national climate registry (3.7 Mtonne CO2eq in 2017). 
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Moreover, emissions from international journeys are increasing at a rapid pace, 
with an average growth of more than 4% per year over the past 18 years. If the 
current growth rate persists, by 2036 the climate impact of international travel to 
Brussels will be more than double the official amount of greenhouse gas emissions 
attributed to Brussels, even more if the emission reduction targets in several other 
sectors are achieved. The problematic nature of this finding is nuanced only to 
a limited extent by the finding that the climate impact of international journeys 
to Brussels is smaller, both counted per trip and in total, than that of comparable 
cities such as Munich, Budapest or Zurich.
Nevertheless, the climate debate itself is shaped only within the framework of the 
currently existing institutions. This means that conferences and events are orga-
nized in central and visible locations worldwide, and that personal interaction be-
tween the protagonists of the climate debate is of great importance. The frantic 
attempts of young climate activists to participate in all of these spatially separated 
events without boarding a plane has involved multi-day train trips and adventures 
with transatlantic sailing ships. Since such endeavours are not possible for most 
official negotiators, the climate debate itself is almost as dependent on fossil fuel 
as many other international decision-making and knowledge development pro-
cesses. On the other hand, from a climate perspective, some locations may be bet-
ter positioned than others to serve as hosts for international discussion forums. 
Our analysis shows that Brussels is in fact doing remarkably well, since the climate 
impact of international travel to Brussels is considerably lower than that of other 
cities with a strong international position. This is partly due to its central location 
in Europe, which means that the impact of business travel in particular is rather 
modest. On the other hand, we should not forget that the strong overall score of 
Brussels compared to cities such as Barcelona,  Prague or Amsterdam is largely due 
to the relatively limited touristic appeal of Brussels in comparison to them.
From a wider perspective, we can conclude that in a rapidly globalizing and – 
at the same time – warming world, failing to territorialize the climate impact 
of international transport it is no longer tenable, especially considering such 
territorial attribution has become common practice for emissions caused by 
industrial activities, agriculture, buildings and domestic transport. Not including 
these emissions in climate registries leads to major biases in the climate debate 
itself. Climate movements such as ‘Youth for Climate’ and ‘Sign for my Future’ argue 
for adaptations to our Global Northern consumption patterns and production 
processes. It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that the real threat lies in 
the increasingly globalized and networked nature of our society. Dependence 
on long-distance travel not only makes our economy more carbon intensive, but 
also our education, research, culture and leisure activities, and even our family 
visits, rely ever more on the consumption of tremendous amounts of kerosene. 
Long distance travel patterns seem to be increasingly embedded in society, and 
less and less reversible. At the same time, in the Global South, the rapid growth of 






































for societal development. And even as less-carbon-intensive alternatives such 
as trains and buses are available for many medium-distance journeys in Europe, 
an absolute reduction in the number of aircraft kilometres travelled remains an 
unattractive idea for most citizens, businesses and organizations, for which broad 
societal support is virtually non-existent. Nevertheless, it is clear that a carbon 
neutral future must be one in which jet aircraft will no longer play a substantial 
role.
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